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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2018, the director of the United States Patent & Trademark Office, Andrei 
Iancu, stated, “the patent grant is less reliable today than it should be.”1 For Nobel Biocare, 
owner of United States Patent 8,714,977 (‘977 patent), the United States patent system 
became the antithesis of reliability. In two separate appellate court decisions, only fourteen 
months apart, the ‘977 patent was found to be valid, then unpatentable. On July 19, 2017, 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed an International Trade Commission 
(ITC) ruling, upholding the validity of the ‘977 patent.2 On September 13, 2018, the same 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the United States Patent & Trademark 
Office’s (USPTO) Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) ruling, regarding the same patent, 
relying on virtually the same evidence, upholding the unpatentability of the ‘977 patent.3
This Comment explores recent developments in the patent system that set the stage for this 
absurd result, analyzes sources of conflict in the law that doom the patent system to repeat 
this problem, and argues for changes to harmonize the patent system and increase the 
reliability of the patent grant. 
The first section of this Comment provides a brief review of the history of the United 
States’ patent system and how recent changes to its statutory design created the perfect 
storm of conditions, which have led to inconsistent results such as those found in the Nobel 
Biocare cases. The Founding Fathers intended that the patent system promote innovation 
through the grant of exclusive rights to inventors.4 An inventor would submit an idea, 
striking a bargain whereby he shared it with the world, and in turn, received a patent—an 
exclusive right to the use of his invention.5 These patents had all of the same attributes as 
property, such as recordation, transferability,6 and the right to prevent another from 
trespassing by making or using patented technology without the patent holder’s 
                                                        
 1. Andrei Iancu, Dir., U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Keynote Address at the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce Patent Policy Conference: Role of U.S. Patent Policy in Domestic Innovation and Potential Impacts 
on Investment (Apr. 11, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-
director-andrei-iancu-us-chamber-commerce-patent-policy-conference). 
2. Instradent USA, Inc. v. ITC, 693 F. App’x 908 (Fed Cir. 2017) (Nobel Biocare was the patent-holder and 
second-named appellee in this case. This Comment focuses on patent-holders and refers to this case and the next 
as the Nobel Biocare cases). 
3. Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
5. Id.
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permission.7 Fast forward to the year 2012 and the passage of the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, which created the USPTO’s PTAB and, with it, a new post-grant review 
process entitled inter partes review.8 The goal of inter partes review proceedings was two-
fold: (1) to help weed out weak patents that should not have been granted by the USPTO 
in the first place and (2) to lower costs and increase the efficiency of patent suits by 
avoiding district court proceedings.9 The constitutionality of inter partes review was 
initially challenged, but on April 24, 2018, the United States Supreme Court announced 
its decision in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, which 
upheld the constitutionality of the inter partes review process, but only narrowly.10
Ultimately, this section of the Comment reveals that patents should be considered personal 
property and regarded with the same respect and rights afforded to other forms of property 
the government secures. 
The second section of this Comment identifies and analyzes Congress’ statutory 
drafting that led to the conflicting results in the Nobel Biocare cases,11 and explains why 
the Supreme Court decided Oil States on such a narrow basis.12 This tension originates 
from a fundamental difference in the way patent grants are conceptualized—patentability 
as opposed to validity—and from a loophole in the America Invents Act that allows 
defendants in infringement lawsuits to circumvent the protections guaranteed to patents. 
Congress conflated these two sides of the same coin by increasing uncertainty for all 
involved, creating a lop-sided patent prosecution process, and contributing to the United 
States patent system tumbling from number one in the world to a tie for twelfth place in 
six years.13
The final section of this Comment identifies potential solutions to the problems 
created by the America Invents Act’s confusion between patentability and validity. The 
first solution addresses a constitutional challenge to inter partes review based on the 
Takings Clause as invited by Oil States.14 The second solution, also invited by the Oil 
                                                        
 7. § 271(a). 
 8. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 311, 125 Stat. 284, 299, 313 (2011). 
 9. Sasha Moss, Charles Duan & Joe Kane, Inter Partes Review as a Means to Improve Patent Quality, R
STREET (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.rstreet.org/2017/09/25/inter-partes-review-as-a-means-to-improve-patent-
quality/. 
10. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1368–70 (2018).  
11. Instradent USA, Inc. v. ITC, 693 Fed. Appx. 908 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent 
USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 12. 138 S. Ct. at 1379. 
 13. MEIR PUGATCH ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER OF COM.: GLOB. INTELLECTUAL PROP. CTR., MEASURING 
MOMENTUM: GIPC INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 26 (1st ed. Dec. 2012), https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/GIPC_Index_Report2012.pdf; MEIR PUGATCH ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER OF COM.: GLOB.
INTELLECTUAL PROP. CTR., THE ROOTS OF INNOVATION: U.S. CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 117 (5th ed. 
Feb. 2017), https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2017_Report.pdf; MEIR PUGATCH ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER OF COM.:
GLOB. INTELLECTUAL PROP. CTR., CREATE: U.S. CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 35 (6th ed. Feb. 2018), 
https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2018.pdf; MEIR PUGATCH ET 
AL., U.S. CHAMBER OF COM.: GLOB. INTELLECTUAL PROP. CTR., INSPIRING TOMORROW: U.S. CHAMBER 
INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 44 (7th ed. Feb. 2019), https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/023593_GIPC_IP_Index_2019_Full_04.pdf. 
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States decision,15 presents a due process challenge to the constitutionality of the same 
statutory language under factors established in Mathews v. Eldridge.16 The third potential 
solution identified is the ability of the Director of the USPTO to address the issues. 
Ultimately, this Comment argues that the time bar loophole should be eliminated to avoid 
an inherently thorny constitutional challenge and to delineate between unpatentability and 
invalidity challenges against patents. 
II. THE 2012 AMERICA INVENTS ACT INTER PARTES REVIEW PROCESS EVISCERATES THE 
VALUE OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT GRANT
The history of the United States’ patent system stretches back to the origins of the 
nation.17 For more than 200 years, United States’ patent law protected the patent grant 
with the same rights as personal property. In the last six years, legislative design and 
judicial decisions have eroded the value of the patent grant by relegating the patent grant 
to little more than that of a public franchise.18 This reduction in rights, in combination 
with Congress’ creation of the inter partes review process, generates significant 
uncertainty in the patent grant. 
The founders of the United States memorialized the importance of patents, both to 
the United States and to the individuals who choose to share their inventions, in the 
supreme law of the land: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries . . . .”19 This quid pro quo is known as the bargain of the patent system.20
The preamble of this clause plainly sets forth the goal of the patent system, and with it, the 
altruistic societal expectation of the bargain—to encourage scientific development through 
the sharing of ideas.21 The subsequent clause identifies the compensation offered to 
inventors for entering into this bargain—that they obtain a “foundational right to exclude 
others from practice of the patented invention.”22 Looming in the background of the patent 
bargain lies the indelible impact that disclosure of an idea leaves on both society and the 
inventor. Once an inventor commits his idea to paper in the form of a patent application, 
and the United States government begins the process of granting a patent in return, the 
inventor no longer maintains exclusive control over his idea.23 The invention is made 
public and laid bare for all the world to see.24
Throughout United States history, the patent grant received the same status and 
esteem as any other piece of personal property. Over time, the legislative, executive, and 
                                                        
 15. Id.
16. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
 18. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 
1375. 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
20. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989). 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
22. Id.; Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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judicial branches of the United States government endeavored to re-shape the patent 
system in an effort to keep in step with changes in society and to combat “‘bad’ patents.”25
While some of these alterations have increased the efficiency of the system, other changes 
have hampered its effectiveness and led to the gradual destruction of the rights guaranteed 
in the grant of a patent. One such change is the implementation of the America Invents 
Act and its creation of the inter partes review process.26 Although it was one of the most 
prominent and crucial changes to patent law in recent history, it created a significant 
loophole that diminished the value of the patent grant. 
A. For More Than Two Centuries, United States’ Patent Law Preserved Patent Grants 
as Full-Fledged Property Rights 
The founding fathers foresaw the importance of individual innovation to the 
country’s advancement and thus, endeavored to protect those inventors who shared their 
knowledge with the world.27 The patent system they established more than two hundred 
years ago continues to exist today as a means to promote technological advancement and 
to protect those who invest their time, money, and resources to research and develop those 
technological advancements. 
Much like the United States Constitution that gave it life, the patent system is a 
living, breathing institution—full of lofty ideals and subject to enormous scrutiny—which 
evolves to address the issues in contemporary society. The United States Constitution 
guarantees inventors “the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”28
This right, “secur[ed] for limited [t]imes” by the United States government to the inventor, 
is at the core of the patent system.29 Two hundred years of case law consistently held that 
patent grants equate to property rights.30 Additionally, the statutes governing the United 
States patent system, including the recent revisions made by the America Invents Act,31
ordain the patent grant with the presumption of validity32 and the attributes of personal 
property.33
The drafters chose to use the words “exclusive Right” when communicating the 
essence of the patent system.34 This choice was no mistake nor mere happenstance35—it
                                                        
25. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 113 (2011). 
 26. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 311, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
27. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 621 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
29. Id. 
 30. Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 197 (1857); United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 
315 (1888); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999); Evans 
v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872 (Va. Cir. 1813). 
 31. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 32. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). 
 33. § 271(a). 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 35. Andrei Iancu, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks at the Eastern District of Texas Bar 
Association Inaugural Texas Dinner (Oct. 18, 2018) (“The only time the word ‘right’ appears was to secure 
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was by design. The word “Right” only appears once in the body of the Constitution, and 
it specifically relates to the guarantee of sole ownership of the works created by inventors 
and writers when they publish their ideas for all the world to see.36 The founding fathers 
recognized the grave circumstances in which they were operating. The United States was 
a fledgling country, “essentially bankrupt” and “hurting economically.”37 Thomas 
Jefferson understood this. In a letter to his sister, Martha Jefferson Carr, dated March 28, 
1787, Thomas Jefferson wrote: “we are obliged to invent and execute; to find means within 
ourselves, and not to lean on others.”38 He knew that for America to survive—let alone 
thrive—the government needed to stimulate innovation. America needed to spur the great 
minds of the time to develop new ideas and share those ideas with their fellow citizens. 
America needed to reward those great minds for their efforts to contribute to the greater 
good of society at large so that the American dream we take for granted today could 
become a reality. 
Central to the design of the patent system is a “carefully crafted bargain.”39 It is a 
quid pro quo wherein inventors are given explicit encouragement to share their knowledge, 
ideas, and inventions with the world, and in return the government secures for the inventor 
a patent monopoly.40 Thus, the patent system creates a symbiotic relationship between 
society and the inventor. In the exchange, the inventor fully discloses his invention.41
Inventors reveal their discovery to the world to expand the knowledge of the community 
as a whole and propel humanity forward. In return, the government provides an exclusive 
right specific to that invention.42 The exclusive right creates a monopoly in which the 
holder of the patent can either manufacture the item covered by the patented technology, 
license the technology to others, or do nothing with it at all.43 The right is the inventor’s
and the inventor’s alone.44 This exclusive right encourages “ex ante innovation—meaning, 
they induce people to invent because of the prospect of profiting from those inventions.”45
Firms that obtain patents “earn on average a 50% premium over” firms that do not obtain 
patents.46 As a result, other inventors are further emboldened to study the patents, learn 
from them, and improve upon them. As Isaac Newton said, “If I have seen further it is by 
                                                        
 36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (The word “right” appears throughout the amendments to the constitution). 
 37. ROBERT E. WRIGHT, ONE NATION UNDER DEBT: HAMILTON, JEFFERSON, AND THE HISTORY OF WHAT
WE OWE 11 (2008). 
 38. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Martha Jefferson Carr (Mar. 28, 1787), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 371, 373 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., 1894). 
39. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 150. (1989). 
40. Id. at 149. 
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 94 (1902) (indicating contract containing an exclusive 
license is in accordance with Congress’ statutes); Woodbridge v United States, 263 U.S. 50, 55–56 (1923); 
Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378–79 (1945) (indicating “failure of patentee to make use of patented 
invention does not affect validity of patent”); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432 (1945).  
44. See cases cited supra note 43. 
 45. Marshall Phelps, Do Patents Really Promote Innovation? A Response to The Economist, FORBES (Sept. 
16, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marshallphelps/2015/09/16/do-patents-really-promote-innovation-a-
response-to-the-economist/#4ec5bae81921.  
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standing on the shoulders of giants.”47
Early jurisprudence recognized the grant of a patent as synonymous with a property 
right.48 For instance, in an 1813 circuit court decision, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote 
that the inventor, “from the moment of the invention,” obtains an “inchoate property 
therein.”49 A property that is “exclusive”; a property that is “secure[d] to the inventor”; a 
property that is “indefeasible,” which “commences with the discovery itself,” and only 
after it has been discovered and disclosed, is “perfected by the patent.”50 In 1857, the 
Supreme Court wrote, “by the laws of the United States, the rights of a party under a patent 
are his private property.”51 In 1876, the Supreme Court stated, “[a] patent for an invention 
is as much property as a patent for land.”52 In 1888, the Supreme Court held that “[t]his is 
property, property of a value so large that nobody has been able to estimate it,” and this 
property in the form of a patent grant is the “exclusive right [of] the patentee.”53 In 1985, 
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals wrote, “It is beyond reasonable debate that patents 
are property.”54 Both the Brown v. Duchesne and Consolidated Fruit Jar v. Wright cases 
were cited in a 1999 case in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “[p]atents . . . have 
long been considered a species of property.”55 This bedrock principle has long been held 
by the judiciary. Patent grants and the rights associated with them are important, valuable, 
and appointed with the same entitlements as personal property. 
Following the early common law developments surrounding patents as personal 
property, Congress agreed with the judiciary, enacting the Patent Act of 1952. In section 
261 of that Act, Congress wrote, “patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”56
The modern-day legislature confirmed the historical holdings of the judiciary. In 35 U.S.C. 
§ 261—the same section—Congress again codified “patents shall have the attributes of 
personal property.”57 For more than two centuries, United States’ patent law treated patent 
grants as full-fledged property rights. The legislature ratified the judiciary’s interpretation, 
codifying the importance of the patent grant, its value, and the level of protection afforded 
to each grant. 
                                                        
 47. Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675) (on file with Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania). 
48. Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (Va. Cir. 1813); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 197 
(1857); Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876); United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 
370 (1888). 
49. Evans, 8 F. Cas. at 873. 
50. Id.
51. Brown, 60 U.S. at 197. 
 52. Consol. Fruit-Jar Co., 94 U.S. at 96. 
 53. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. at 370. 
 54. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
55. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (citing 
Brown, 60 U.S. 183; Consol. Fruit-Jar Co., 94 U.S. 96). 
 56. Patent Law Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 261).  
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B. The 2012 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Created the Inter Partes Review Process 
Which Cancels Issued Patents at an Alarming Rate 
In 2011, Congress passed into law the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, bringing 
with it some of the most significant changes to United States’ patent law since the Patent 
Act of 1952.58 The America Invents Act formed the newly minted Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board while simultaneously revising and expanding a number of post-patent-grant 
opposition procedures.59 These post-grant procedures preserved ex parte reexamination, 
created post-grant review, and converted inter partes reexamination to an adjudicative 
proceeding, renaming it inter partes review.60 The inter partes review process allows third 
parties to challenge the USPTO’s decision to grant a patent as an added layer of quality 
control and error correction.61 Although these third party challenges are intended to 
increase the efficiency of the patent system and the quality of the issued patents, these 
challenges frequently end in a finding of unpatentability at a distressing rate, resulting in 
the cancellation of patents. This ultimately undermines the finality of any patent grant. 
Under the America Invents Act, a third party may challenge a patent by filing a 
“petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent.”62 Once instituted, an inter partes 
review proceeds in a very similar fashion to that of traditional district court litigation. The 
third-party petitioner and patent holder engage in motion practice, discovery may be 
sought by the parties, depositions may be taken, witnesses may be cross-examined, and 
evidence may be introduced pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence.63 Further, the 
language of the USPTO indicates similarities between inter partes review and typical 
litigation. For instance, the USPTO refers to the adversarial oral argument before the 
PTAB as a “trial,” the members of the PTAB that decide the matter “judges,” and the final 
written decision handed down as a “judgment.”64
The inter partes review process which the PTAB oversees is intended to allow 
members of the public a short period in which they can bring narrow challenges to the 
issuance of a patent based on prior art that the USPTO may have overlooked during its 
review and granting process. The statute of limitations confined the time frame for 
petitions to be brought to the nine months following the grant of a patent.65 The challenges 
are limited to “request[s] to cancel 1 or more claim of a patent only on a ground that could 
be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents 
or printed publications.”66 The statute also includes strict estoppel language precluding a 
petitioner, real party in interest, or privy from challenging the same patent claims before 
                                                        
 58. David Goldman, Patent Reform Is Finally on Its Way, CNN MONEY (June 24, 2011), 
https://money.cnn.com/2011/06/24/technology/patent_reform_bill/index.htm; Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 59. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 20 (2011); 35 U.S.C. § 316(c) (2012). 
 60. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 45–47. 
61. Id. at 40. 
 62. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). 
63. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1378 (2018). 
64. Id.
 65. § 311(c)(1). 
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the PTAB on “any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised.”67
Even with the stringent standards in place, the inter partes review process has been 
extremely popular among individual petitioners and defendants in patent infringement 
suits. In October 2013, Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall Rader called the Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board “death squads, kind of killing property rights.”68 The USPTO’s own 
statistics indicate that as of September 30, 2015, just three years after the enactment of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 575 final written decisions from inter partes review 
proceedings were handed down.69 Eighty-seven percent of all patents challenged in an 
inter partes review trial between the enactment of the bill and September 30, 2015, were 
found to be unpatentable with regard to all or some of their claims.70 The current statistics 
do not paint a different picture. As of September 30, 2018, fully eighty percent of all claims 
were found unpatentable in some regard.71 Of the 2,268 final written decisions handed 
down in inter partes review since its formation, as well as post-grant review proceedings 
and covered business method proceedings, 1,888 of them found some or all of the 
challenged claims unpatentable.72 At best, these staggering statistics indicate that the 
USPTO has quality control issues that need to be addressed. At worst, third parties abuse 
the system by challenging already issued patents in a forum that costs less, proceeds more 
quickly, and has lower standards than district court proceedings. Either way, the inter 
partes review process leads to the cancellation of already issued patents at an alarming 
rate. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Oil States Decision Misconstrues the Patent Property Right to 
That of a Public Franchise 
In April 2018, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Oil 
States Energy Services, LLC. v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC. The Court held that 
Congress’ creation of the inter partes review process as part of the 2012 Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act was indeed constitutional. In so doing, it also construed the patent 
grant as a public franchise.73 The Supreme Court’s holding that patents are not personal 
property, but rather are consigned to that of a public franchise, severely misconstrues the 
historical record to the detriment of patent holders, ultimately devaluing the patent grant 
and hampering innovation. 
The Court explains that “Congress has created administrative processes that 
authorize the [US]PTO to reconsider and cancel patent claims that were wrongly issued.”74
                                                        
 67. § 315(e)(1). 
 68. Ryan Davis, PTAB’s ‘Death Squad’ Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief Says, LAW360 (Aug. 14, 2014), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/567550/ptab-s-death-squad-label-not-totally-off-base-chief-says. 
 69. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 9 (Sept. 30, 2015), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-09-30%20PTAB.pdf. 
 70. Id.
    71.   PATENT TRIAL & APPEAL BD., U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRIAL STATISTICS IPR, PGR, 
CGM 11 (July 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics_20180731.pdf. 
 72. Id.
73. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1375 (2018). 
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While technically correct as to the inter partes review process itself, this holding fails to 
take into account the entire course of challenges that unfold in practice. The Court 
established that if an agency grants a right to an individual, the agency has the power to 
take that right away.75 In other words, the public-rights doctrine—under which Congress 
can prescribe adjudication of claims to an administrative agency—applies76 and inter 
partes review fits neatly within that doctrine.77 The Court stated that “the decision to grant 
a patent is a matter involving public rights—specifically, the grant of a public franchise.”78
In so holding, the Court wrote that inter partes review is limited to a reassessment of the 
USPTO’s grant of the patent in the first place. In its reading of the statute, the Court held 
that Congress “reserved the PTO’s authority to conduct that reconsideration. Thus, the 
PTO can do so without violating Article III.”79
This reconsideration may be permissible as it relates to the initial grant of a patent. 
It should not and cannot extend to the entire lifetime of the patent. Expanding this avenue 
of challenge beyond the initial grant of the patent and applying it to the entire lifetime of 
the patent effectively ensures that a patent right never truly vests. The title to the granted 
property is never fully quieted and it is subjected to a standard of review that flies in the 
face of two-hundred-plus years of judicial precedent and statutory protection. This result 
conflates the intent of the inter partes review process—to correct patents granted in error—
with the adjudication and protection of rights proscribed to Article III courts. 
Yet, the Court was careful to “emphasize the narrowness of [its] holding.”80 The 
Court only addressed the “constitutionality of inter partes review,” and limited its review 
to “only the precise constitutional challenges that Oil States raised.”81 That specific 
challenge was described by the Court as “whether inter partes review violates Article 
III.”82 This issue could easily, yet incorrectly, be mistaken to read that inter partes review
does not violate Article III in every instance. While it is true that the Court held that inter 
partes review does not violate Article III of the Constitution, it did so only as to the 
authority of the United States government to cancel patent claims that were wrongly 
issued—a process that results in a finding of unpatentability.83 To that end, the Court was 
correct that the inter partes review process is valid and constitutional because the core of 
the process is indeed similar to other constitutional processes already in place within the 
USPTO. However, when extended beyond the initial grant of a patent, the rationale of the 
holding and the constitutionality of the process begin to unravel. 
                                                        
75. Id. at 1374. 
76. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856). 
77. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373. 
78. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1379. 
81. Id. (emphasis added). 
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III. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE GOVERNING THE INTER PARTES REVIEW PROCESS 
CIRCUMVENTS THE AUTHORITY OF ARTICLE III COURTS AND PRODUCES ABSURD 
RESULTS FOR PATENT HOLDERS
Congress intended the America Invents Act to incorporate new processes and 
procedures to “streamline[]” the patent system by making it more efficient, while 
simultaneously “improv[ing] patent quality,” by allowing third parties to assist the USPTO 
with quality control through unpatentability challenges.84 It is true that the inter partes 
review process ultimately concludes faster than a district court would under the same or 
similar circumstances. It is also true that the inter partes review process is less expensive 
for alleged infringers than traditional litigation.85 However, patent holders bear the true 
cost—both tangible and intangible. The America Invents Act’s statutory design creates a 
loophole for defendants in patent infringement suits. 
Federal courts maintain exclusive jurisdiction over cases “arising under any Act of 
Congress relating to patents.”86 When patent holders believe that another entity utilizes 
their patented technology without permission, the patent holder may file a lawsuit alleging 
that the defendant is infringing on the patent holder’s rights.87 In an infringement suit, a 
defendant may then plead the affirmative defense of invalidity, claiming that a patent 
should not have been granted by the USPTO in the first place.88 Because a patent is 
“presumed valid” under the America Invents Act, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous 
decision, held that defendants must prove their invalidity defense by a clear and convincing 
standard.89 The loophole created in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) allows a defendant in a patent 
infringement suit to challenge the validity of a patent at virtually any time during a patent’s 
life, unshackled from the Article III judicial system, and subject to a far more favorable 
burden of proof—preponderance of the evidence.90 This loophole conflates the concept of 
patentability—the process of issuing a patent and performing error correction, with 
validity—the process of challenging a patent as an affirmative defense in litigation. 
Traditionally, a patent holder identifies a company allegedly using the patented 
technology without permission.91 The patent holder then files suit against that company 
for patent infringement,92 which is similar to the real property concept of trespass. A patent 
holder owns the technology that he claims to have invented in the form of an issued 
patent.93 The claims of a patent are like the borders of a piece of real property. The patent 
holder has an exclusive right to his claimed invention, and unauthorized users of that 
                                                        
 84. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011). 
 85. Jason E. Stach & Jeffrey A. Freeman, District Court or the PTO: Choosing Where to Litigate Patent 
Invalidity, FINNEGAN (Mar./Apr. 2014), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/district-court-or-the-pto-
choosing-where-to-litigate-patent.html.  
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 
 87. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 88. § 282(b)(2). 
89. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011). 
 90. § 316(e). 
 91. § 271(a). 
92. Id.
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invention are infringers, just like unauthorized persons on land are trespassers.94
Therefore, patent owners may sue for damages “to compensate for the infringement, but 
in no event less than a reasonable royalty.”95
One possible argument against infringement is an affirmative defense in which the 
defendant may attempt to prove the invalidity of the patent—arguing that the patent cannot 
be infringed because it should not have been issued by the USPTO in the first place. 
Because the United States government granted the patent, because it is a property right, 
and because the affirmative defense purports to strip the plaintiff of a property right, the 
legislature and the judiciary afford a high level of protection to the patent grant. Thus, 35 
U.S.C. § 282(a) commands that an issued patent “shall be presumed valid,”96 and 35 
U.S.C. § 273 states that “[a] person asserting a defense under this section shall have the 
burden of establishing the defense by clear and convincing evidence.”97 The Supreme 
Court in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Parnership upheld this requirement of proving 
invalidity by a clear and convincing standard.98 In a unanimous decision, the Court noted 
this “heightened standard of proof is an essential component of the patent ‘bargain.’”99
However, the America Invents Act’s statutory design as it relates to the inter partes 
review process changes the dynamics of this challenge significantly. First and foremost, 
the inter partes review process is focused on correcting errors made by the USPTO during 
its review of a patent application leading up to the point in time that the patent ultimately 
issues.100 The USPTO determines the patentability of an invention during its examinations 
under a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof.101 Congress’ statutory design in 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act compels the PTAB to utilize the same 
preponderance of the evidence standard in the inter partes review process.102 The Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act’s language limits a third party challenge to the patentability of 
an invention to a nine month period following the grant of the patent.103 This statute of 
limitations appears to comport with the statutory language which commands that an issued 
“patent shall be presumed valid.”104 The statute provides third parties with a short period 
in which they may challenge the patentability of a patent under inter partes review to assist 
the USPTO with quality control, while ultimately vesting property rights and protecting 
the issued patent. 
Nevertheless, a loophole exists in the language of the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act allowing a defendant in a lawsuit to petition to institute an inter partes review up to 
“[one] year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the 
                                                        
94. Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 196 (1857). 
 95. § 284. 
 96. § 282(a). 
 97. § 273(b). 
 98. 564 U.S. 91, 113–14 (2011). 
99. Id. at 112 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989)). 
 100. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 50 (2011). 
 101. MPEP § 2001(b)(3) (9th ed., Jan. 2018). 
 102. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). 
 103. § 311(c). 
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petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”105 This 
effectively allows a defendant in a patent infringement suit—regardless of the point in 
time in which the suit is brought—a choice between venues in which to challenge the grant 
of a patent. The first option for a defendant is to proceed with the affirmative defense of 
invalidity in a district court under a clear and convincing standard, with the increasing 
likelihood that the case will be heard by a jury.106 The second option allows a defendant 
to sidestep these requirements. Instead, the party may elect to challenge the patentability 
of a patent in inter partes review in front of an administrative panel, without a jury, under 
the lower and easier to meet preponderance of the evidence standard.107 While the 
defendant in an infringement suit gets the option to choose the line of attack, the patent 
holder is subject to exposure on two fronts. This produces absurd results for a patent holder 
because it guarantees that the taxes paid to maintain the patent and the ultimate death of 
the patent grant are the only rights that the government truly secures for the patent holder. 
A. Article III Proceedings Provide Considerable Protection to Patent Grants 
United States patent law secures for inventors their exclusive rights to their property 
in the form of a patent grant.108 Once property rights are secured, the United States 
Constitution declares that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”109 Article III district courts ensure the protection of those secured rights 
by adhering to the statutory language endowing patents with a presumption of validity,110
and by requiring defendants to prove the invalidity of a patent by a clear and convincing 
standard.111
Judicial independence is a hallmark of the United States’ justice system that is 
“sometimes take[n] for granted.”112 However, the independence of the judiciary is of 
critical importance to the preservation of constitutionally protected rights. The Article III 
court system “act[s] as ‘an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in 
order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their 
authority.’”113 Congress understood the importance of judicial independence and 
committed patent rights and related controversies explicitly to the original jurisdiction of 
                                                        
 105. § 315. 
 106. PRICE WATERHOUSE AND COOPERS & LYBRAND, 2017 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 1, 6 (May 2017), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2017-patent-litigation-study.pdf. 
 107. § 316(e); see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(Newman, J., dissenting). 
 108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 109. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 110. § 282(a). 
111. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 112–14 (2011); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 
S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016). 
112. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1380 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting). 
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Article III courts.114
The judicial branch provides considerable protection to the property rights 
associated with the grant of a patent. In Cuozzo Speed, the Supreme Court stated that a 
defendant in an infringement suit “must prove invalidity by ‘clear and convincing 
evidence.’”115 The Supreme Court in Commil USA added that this standard is a “high bar” 
to overcome.116 For almost thirty years, the Federal Circuit has held that the clear and 
convincing standard is appropriate.117 In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, the 
Supreme Court pointed out this burden is appropriate even in infringement suits in which 
the defendant’s invalidity contentions include evidence not previously considered by the 
USPTO.118 Furthermore, Congress itself “codif[ied] the common-law presumption of 
patent validity and, implicitly, the heightened standard of proof attached to it.”119
1. The Common Law, Statutory Language, and Administrative Rules All Endow 
Patents with a Presumption of Validity 
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, written and passed by Congress in 2012 
states, “[a] patent shall be presumed valid.”120 This categorical, unqualified, general 
statement appears in Title 35 of the United States Code under Part III entitled, “Patents 
and Protection of Patent Rights.”121 Congress’ statutory mandate takes into account the 
importance of patent rights to individuals, that struggle to create the patented technology, 
placing the burden of proving invalidity of a patent or a claim on the party asserting the 
defense of invalidity. 
The presumption of validity originated in the common law, and Congress codified 
the presumption in section 282 of The Patent Act of 1952.122 As originally written, the 
entirety of section 282 reads as follows: “A patent shall be presumed valid. The burden of 
establishing invalidity of a patent shall rest on the party asserting it.”123 The passage of 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in 2012 did nothing to change the core presumption 
found in section 282 of The Patent Act of 1952. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
retained the same section number and expounded on the presumption, extending it to not 
just the patent itself, but each claim within the patent; notwithstanding the fact that the 
claims may depend on another invalid claim.124
Following its codification, various levels of the court system endorsed the 
presumption of patent validity. In its discussion of legal standards as applied to summary 
                                                        
 114. 28 U.S.C. § 1338. 
115. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2144. 
116. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (2015). 
117. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 113 (2011). 
118. Id. at 108–12. 
119. Id. at 108. 
 120. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). 
121. 35 U.S.C. (referencing Part III titled, “Patents and Protection of Patent Rights”).
122. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 35 U.S.C. § 
282(a) (originally enacted as The Patent Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812).
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judgment, the Northern District of California wrote “[p]atents are presumed valid,” 
referencing 35 U.S.C. § 282(a).125 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated, 
“[t]o summarize on this point, § 282 creates a presumption that a patent is valid and 
imposes the burden of proving invalidity on the attacker.”126 In another case, the Federal 
Circuit wrote, “Section 282 plainly states that a patent’s claims are presumed valid 
independent of one another.”127 Finally, the Supreme Court held that “[b]y its express 
terms, § 282 establishes a presumption of patent validity, and it provides that a challenger 
must overcome that presumption to prevail on an invalidity defense.”128
In addition, the USPTO explains the importance of the presumption of validity 
within its Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP).129 In section 1701, the MPEP 
is clear: “Every patent is presumed to be valid. See 35 U.S.C. 282, first sentence.”130 It 
further states that “[i]t is important for an examiner to properly communicate the basis for 
a rejection . . . . Since issued patents are presumed valid131 and constitute a property 
right,132 the written record must be clear as to the basis for the grant.”133
All three branches of government agree that patents are guaranteed the presumption 
of validity. The presumption of validity protects the guarantee of property rights in the 
form of a patent grant.134 The judiciary created the presumption through judge-made law, 
Congress saw fit to enshrine the presumption in the laws of the United States, and the 
USPTO recognizes the presumption in its manual which governs the execution of its 
duties. 
2. Proving Patent Invalidity Requires a Showing by a Clear and Convincing 
Standard 
Once the USPTO issues a patent and the patent holder asserts it in a lawsuit against 
an alleged infringer, the infringer may raise an affirmative defense of invalidity of the 
patent.135 As discussed above, once issued, patents are presumed valid.136 The 
presumption of validity carries with it the burden that a defense of invalidity be proven by 
“establishing the defense by clear and convincing evidence.”137 The clear and convincing 
standard is “high,”138 falling in between “the usual civil law standard” of preponderance 
                                                        
125. Sentius Int’l, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 5:13-cv-00825-PSG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113917, at *13 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2014) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282(a)). 
126. Am. Hoist, & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1360. 
127. ArcelorMittal Fr. v. AK Steel Corp., 786 F.3d 885, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
128. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 100 (2011). 
 129. MPEP §§ 706.02(j), 1701, 2003 (9th ed., Jan. 2018). 
 130. MPEP § 1701 (emphasis added). 
 131. MPEP § 706.02(j) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282(a)) (internal citation omitted). 
 132. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 261) (internal citation omitted). 
 133. Id.
 134. 35 U.S.C. § 261. 
 135. § 282(b)(2). 
 136. § 282(a). 
 137. § 273(b). 
138.   Guardian Indus. Corp. v. AFG Indus., No. 03-73722, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66978, at *36 (E.D. Mich. 
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of the evidence, and “the criminal law standard of . . . guilt” beyond a reasonable doubt.139
The Supreme Court established the standard as early as 1934 when it upheld a patent 
in a suit because the challenger had failed to establish his claims “by convincing 
evidence.”140 More recently, in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, the Supreme Court 
noted that the Federal Circuit has read the clear and convincing standard into section 282 
of The Patent Act of 1952 since 1984.141 Further, the Microsoft Corp. Court stated that 
since that 1984 decision in American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., “the 
Federal Circuit has never wavered in this interpretation.”142 Similarly, following the 
passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act which replaced The Patent Act of 1952, 
the Cuozzo Speed Court indicated, “in [a] district court, a challenger must prove invalidity 
by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’”143 The same standard of proving invalidity by clear 
and convincing evidence existed prior to the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act in 2012 and it exists to this day. 
B. The Article I Inter Partes Review Process Affords Challengers an Opportunity to 
Sidestep the Protections of Article III District Court Proceedings 
The USPTO’s inter partes review process provides patent challengers with the 
opportunity to circumvent the safeguards of district court proceedings. Any person—
whether involved in litigation over the patent or not—who wishes to challenge the 
patentability of a patent may do so by filing a petition for inter partes review. This petition 
must be filed within nine months following the issuance of that patent.144 However, 35 
U.S.C. § 315(b) provides a loophole whereby a defendant in a patent infringement suit 
may file a petition for inter partes review at any time within one year after a complaint of 
infringement is filed.145
Patents are valid for twenty years from the date of filing.146 Patent holders may sue 
for infringement and recover damages for infringing activities that occurred up to six years 
prior to the filing of the suit.147 Thus, a patent may be asserted in an infringement action 
up to twenty-six years after its initial filing. Tack on the statute of limitations found in 35 
U.S.C. § 315(b) and this effectively allows a defendant to challenge the patentability of a 
patent grant up to twenty-seven years after it is applied for under a far inferior standard—
preponderance of the evidence—than that provided by an Article III court—clear and 
                                                        
139. Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
140. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 7 (1934) (quoting Austin Machinery Co. v. 
Buckeye Traction Ditcher Co., 13 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1926)) ("[T]he presumption of the validity of the patent 
is such that the defense of invention by another must be established by the clearest proof—perhaps beyond 
reasonable doubt."). 
141. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 97 (2011) (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & 
Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
142. Id. at 98. 
143. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (citing Microsoft Corp., 564 U.S. at 95). 
 144. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c)(1). 
 145. § 315(b). 
 146. § 154(a)(2). 
147. Id. (establishing term of patent grant); § 271(a) (establishing right to claim of infringement of patent 
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convincing. 
1. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Crafted a Loophole Allowing 
Defendants in a Lawsuit to Challenge a Patent under the Inter Partes Review
Process up to Twenty-Seven Years after a Patent Has Been Issued 
Congress introduced and passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act under the 
guise of making the patent system more efficient at adjudicating patent challenges and 
more effective at eliminating bad patents.148 Via the inter partes review process, Congress 
gave anyone the opportunity to challenge a patent within nine months of the grant of that 
patent.149 Through 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), a defendant in a district court patent infringement 
suit is allowed to challenge a patent’s validity in an administrative inter partes review
proceeding up to one year after a defendant is served with a complaint.150 As explained 
below, this post-suit loophole affords defendants the ability to challenge the patentability 
of a patent at virtually any time during a patent’s life, potentially twenty-seven years after 
the patentee applies for the patent. 
The USPTO grants patent monopolies for a specified twenty-year term.151 The clock 
begins to run from the date on which application is filed, even though a patent may be 
issued years after the initial application.152 A lawsuit may be brought at any time for a 
cause of action based on infringing activity occurring during the twenty-year term when 
the patent is in force.153 Further, suits for patent infringement can recover damages for 
infringing activities that took place up to six years prior to the filing of the lawsuit.154
Thus, the holder of a patent grant could theoretically file suit against an infringer for one 
day’s worth of damages up to twenty-five years and 364 days after the initial application 
for the patent.155 Once the complaint is served on a defendant, that defendant may then 
petition for inter partes review up to one year after the service of the complaint.156
Therefore, a defendant in a patent infringement suit may challenge the grant of a patent 
approximately twenty-seven years from the time of the patentee’s application for the 
patent. 
Although it is admittedly unlikely that a patent holder would file suit for one day’s 
worth of damages, it is entirely within the realm of possibility. The theoretical possibility 
that a patent holder may lose his patent nearly thirty years after making application is the 
real logical absurdity. 
                                                        
 148. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011). 
 149. § 311(c)(1). 
 150. § 315(b). 
 151. § 154(a)(2). 
152. Id.
 153. § 271(a). 
 154. § 286. 
 155. §§ 271(a), 286. 
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2. The Burden of Proof to Support a Finding of Unpatentability in Inter Partes 
Review Proceedings Merely Requires a Preponderance of the Evidence as 
Opposed to the Higher, Clear and Convincing, Standard Applied by Article 
III District Courts 
Unlike the clear and convincing standard required to invalidate a patent in district 
courts, inter partes review challenges to the patentability of a patent apply a preponderance 
of the evidence standard to the burden of proof. In 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), entitled 
“Evidentiary Standards,” it is stated, “[i]n an inter partes review . . . the petitioner shall 
have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”157 This much lower standard is directly at odds with the standard in district 
courts, a dichotomy that many judges have noticed. 
In 1986, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clearly explained, “when the 
prior art before the court is the same as that before the USPTO, the burden on the party 
asserting invalidity is more difficult to meet.”158 In 2008, the Federal Circuit indicated the 
preponderance of the evidence burden of proof is “substantially lower” than that of a civil 
case brought in district courts.159 In 2011, the Supreme Court in Microsoft showed that 
the common-law presumption of validity and the requirement of clear and convincing 
evidence “reflected the universal understanding that a preponderance standard of proof 
was too ‘dubious’ a basis to deem a patent invalid.”160
In 2012, following the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, the Baxter
court in the Federal Circuit cited the Swanson and Microsoft decisions, “illustrat[ing] the 
distinction between a reexamination and a district court proceeding.”161 Specifically, the 
court noted that challengers that attack the validity of a patent in district court proceedings, 
requiring clear and convincing evidence, may fail to prove that a patent is invalid.162
However, the same challenge may indeed be successful in USPTO proceedings due to the 
lesser standard of preponderance of the evidence and the lack of the presumption of 
validity despite this requirement in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.163 Thus, 
unpatentability challenges brought in front of the USPTO demand far less of the challenger 
because of the less stringent burdens. 
C. The Nobel Biocare Cases Demonstrate the Bizarre Result of Conflating Invalidity 
with Unpatentability 
As explained above, the USPTO concerns itself with the review of patent 
                                                        
 157. § 316(e). 
158. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 447 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
159. In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
160. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 102 (2011) (quoting Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g
Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934)). 
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applications and the issuance of patent grants. Patent grants are awarded when the subject 
matter is found to be patentable.164 If a patent’s subject matter falls into any number of 
exceptions—such as a lack of novelty,165 the subject matter of the patent is obvious,166
etc.—a patent may be found to be unpatentable by the USPTO before its issuance.167
Following a patent’s issuance by the USPTO, challengers who believe the USPTO 
made a mistake in granting the patent, because the patent’s subject matter falls into one of 
the above exceptions, may petition to begin inter partes review proceedings based on a 
claim of unpatentability.168 Inter partes review proceedings are limited to challenges “only 
on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103,” that is to say, only on the 
grounds of lack of novelty or the subject matter of the patent is obvious.169
On the other hand, a federal district court concentrates on the infringement suit by 
the plaintiff and any affirmative defenses raised, such as the defense of invalidity.170 A 
defense of invalidity claims that a patent grant should not have been issued in the first 
place by the USPTO.171 A finding of invalidity is based upon the grounds that a patent 
lacks novelty, the subject matter is obvious, or any other basis provided for in the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act.172
Both challenges—unpatentability and invalidity—go to the same issue: whether a 
patent should have been granted by the USPTO in the first place. However, unpatentability 
only comprises a subset of two types of challenges considered by invalidity,173 whereas 
invalidity incorporates the entire universe of possible challenges to the grant of a patent.174
Additionally, unpatentability need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence in 
an inter partes review proceeding,175 whereas invalidity must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence in a district court proceeding.176
Based upon historical United States jurisprudence and the edicts of Congress, these 
two variations of the challenge, to whether a patent should have been granted by the 
USPTO in the first place, make perfect sense. If a patent’s subject matter is evaluated by 
the USPTO on a preponderance of the evidence standard and ultimately granted based on 
that standard, the subject matter should be reviewable for error under the same 
preponderance of the evidence standard. However, Congress established that “[a] patent 
shall be presumed valid,”177 and the Supreme Court held the applicable standard to be 
                                                        
 164. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 165. § 102. 
 166. § 103. 
 167. § 101. 
 168. § 311(b). 
 169. Id; see also §§ 102, 103. 
 170. § 282(b)(2). 
 171. Id; see also §§ 100, 102, 103. 
172. § 282(b)(2). 
 173. §§ 311(b), 102, 103. 
 174. §§ 282(b)(2), 100, 102, 103. 
 175. § 316(e). 
176. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 112 (2011). 
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read into that statutory language was “clear and convincing.”178 Congress adequately 
addressed this conflict in standards by establishing a statute of limitations for inter partes 
review under the lower standard to a term of nine months following the grant of the 
patent.179 This time-limited review of a granted patent under the lower standard would 
seem to conform to the mandates of Congress as they relate to a patent grant, the historical 
jurisprudence surrounding a granted patent as property, and the Constitution’s guarantee 
of a patent as a right. Unpatentability goes to the correction of a patent issued mistakenly 
by the USPTO in the first place, whereas invalidity goes to whether a patentee’s granted 
patent should be taken from him because the USPTO made a mistake in granting the patent 
in the first place. 
However, the time bar loophole identified in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) conflates the 
concepts of unpatentability and invalidity. Unpatentability challenges are normally limited 
to only nine months after the issuance of a patent grant with the intent of correcting an 
error made by the USPTO under a preponderance of the evidence standard. The loophole 
allows a defendant in an infringement suit to circumvent the need to raise the affirmative 
defense of invalidity under the higher burden of clear and convincing standard and instead 
file a petition for inter partes review within one year after receiving notice of the 
infringement suit. This effectively allows a defendant to challenge the constitutionally 
protected patent at any time while avoiding the congressionally mandated presumption of 
validity and the judicially interpreted standard of clear and convincing evidence. 
The Nobel Biocare cases demonstrate the bizarre result of conflating invalidity with 
unpatentability. Nobel Biocare (Nobel) owns United States Patent 8,714,977 applied for 
November 26, 2012 and granted May 6, 2014.180 On September 25, 2014, Nobel filed a 
complaint with the ITC.181 On August 19, 2014, Nobel filed an infringement suit against 
Neodent.182 On August 20, 2015, Instradent filed a petition for inter partes review.183 This 
petition was filed fifteen months and fourteen days after the patent was granted; six months 
and fourteen days beyond the statute of limitations for inter partes review,184 but just in 
time for the USPTO to grant the petition for inter partes review as a result of the time bar 
loophole.185 Had the time bar loophole not existed, Instradent would have been required 
to present its affirmative defense of invalidity in district court under the clear and 
convincing standard. 
Fast forward to July 19, 2017. On that date the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit affirmed an International Trade Commission (ITC) ruling, upholding the validity 
                                                        
178. Microsoft Corp., 564 U.S. at 102. 
 179. § 311(c)(1). 
180. Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018); U.S. Patent No. 
8,717,977 (filed Nov. 26, 2012). 
181. Nobel Biocare Servs. v. Neodent USA, Inc., No. SACV14-1322-DOC (DFMx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
194460, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014). 
182. Id.; To Further Drive Our Business, Instradent Integrates into the Straumann Group, STRAUMANN GRP., 
https://www.straumann.com/group/en/home/our-brands-and-partners/global-brands/instradent.html (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2019) (Instradent serves as the global distributor of Neodent). 
183. Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 184. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c)(1). 
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of the ‘977 patent under a clear and convincing standard—the same standard required by 
an affirmative defense of invalidity.186 However, because Instradent was allowed to 
petition for inter partes review, it was able to challenge the patentability of the ‘977 patent 
under the lower standard of preponderance of the evidence. On September 13, 2018, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the USPTO’s PTAB ruling. It did so 
regarding the same patent, relying on virtually the same evidence, upholding the 
unpatentability of the ‘977 patent under a preponderance of the evidence standard.187 Two 
separate administrative agencies: one, applying an Article III district court’s burden of 
proof, found that the USPTO did not make a mistake in issuing the patent; the other, 
applying the lower burden of proof, found that the USPTO did make a mistake in issuing 
the patent. This is a bizarre and absurd result flowing from the conflation of unpatentability 
and invalidity—two different challenges based on two separate premises with disparate 
standards. 
IV. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS “WITH NARROWLY TAILORED SOLUTIONS”
The director of the USPTO, Andrei Iancu, recently said that “when we do encounter 
abuses, we should address them promptly and with narrowly tailored solutions.”188 The 
patent system has undergone enormous growing pains in recent history as a result of the 
boom of the information age.189 The new inter partes review system has been in place for 
more than six years now, practitioners have embraced the changes,190 and parties have 
settled into the strategic paths each avenue affords.191
However, not everyone is content with the new normal: In Oil States, a constitutional 
challenge was brought against inter partes review.192 Inter partes review withstood the 
particular challenges brought against it in that case, but the Supreme Court intimated that 
challenges to the proceeding under the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause may 
                                                        
186. Instradent USA, Inc. v. ITC, 693 F. App’x 908 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Motorola Mobility, LLC v. ITC, 737 
F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship., 564 U.S. 91, 95).
187. Nobel Biocare Servs. AG, 903 F.3d at 1383. 
 188. Iancu, Remarks at the Eastern District of Texas Bar Association Inaugural Texas Dinner, supra note 35. 
 189. Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Trouble Quest for 
Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2052 (2009) (238,850 in 1998 to 460,000 in 2008); Patent Tech. 
Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2019) (589,410 utility-
patent applications in 2015). 
 190. Salumeh R. Loesch & Jeffrey S. Love, New Patent Challenge Options Under AIA (Aug. 20, 2012); 
Zachary Brennan, Generic Drugmakers Embrace Inter Partes Review Process, REG. AFF. PROF’LS (Sept. 4, 
2018), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2018/9/generic-drugmakers-embrace-inter-partes-
review-pro. 
 191. ACC America, Offensive and Defensive Strategies for Post Grant Challenges in the Life Sciences (Nov. 
14, 2013); Robert M. Asher, Inter Partes Review and Claim Amendment Strategies after Aqua Products, AM.
BAR ASS’N (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/intellectual-
property/practice/2017/inter-partes-review-and-claim-amendment-strategies-after-aqua-products/; Amending 
Claims During Inter Partes Review: Patent Practitioners Beware, JONES DAY (Aug. 5, 2014), 
https://www.jonesday.com/Amending-Claims-During-Inter-Partes-Review-Patent-Practitioners-Beware-08-05-
2014/. 
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be warranted.193 While these challenges may be warranted, if successful they “risk 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater,”194 because the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act lacks a severability clause.195
A. A Constitutional Takings Challenge Treats the Symptoms, Not the Source 
Almost immediately following the Supreme Court’s Oil States invitation to 
challenge the inter partes review process under the Takings Clause, Christy, Inc. filed a 
class-action complaint against the United States of America on behalf of inventors and 
patent owners.196 Christy, Inc. asserted it owned a patent found to be unpatentable by the 
USPTO’s PTAB through inter partes review.197 Christy Inc. contended that the USPTO’s 
cancellation of a patent grant as unpatentable constituted a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment, and thus, the compensation due to the class members “includes, but is not 
limited to, expected royalties and other payments related to use of the patents.”198 Shortly 
thereafter, Advanced Audio Devices filed a petition for writ of certiorari on the same issue, 
which was denied by the Supreme Court.199 The United States Court of Federal Claims 
subsequently dismissed Christy Inc.’s suit for failure to state a claim.200 While both of 
these cases attempted to take on the Supreme Court’s invitation in Oil States to challenge 
inter partes review under the Takings Clause,201 neither of these lawsuits address the 
source of the problem—the erosion of patentee’s rights. Rather, both Christy Inc.’s and 
Advanced Audio Devices’ suits attempt to treat the symptoms by going after the 
pocketbook of the government. 
Christy Inc.’s class action suit addressed multiple symptoms resulting from the 
cancellation of a patent grant, which can be categorized in two separate buckets: (1) the 
investment necessary to create, apply for, and maintain a patent, and (2) the loss of income 
from the licensing and royalty fees. First, the investment itself can include time, money, 
and resources expended in developing the underlying inventions of a patent, the attorney’s 
fees incurred in prosecuting the patent application and subsequently defending it in a post-
grant proceeding, as well as any and all fees paid to the USPTO for the examination and 
issuance of the patent.202 Second, the loss of income from licensing and royalty fees is 
prospective in nature,203 and if not determined through a settlement between the parties, 
                                                        
193. Id. at 1379. 
 194. Iancu, Remarks at the Eastern District of Texas Bar Association Inaugural Texas Dinner, supra note 35. 
 195. 112 CONG. REC. 4,491 (2011) (severability clause offered, without objection, for inclusion within the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and subsequently removed without objection). 
196. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365; Complaint, Christy, Inc. v. United States, 2019 U.S. Claims LEXIS 29 (Fed. 
Cl. 2018) (No. 18-657 C) (first amended complaint filed July 30, 2018). 
197. Complaint, supra note 196, at 27. 
198. Id. at 1, 32. 
199. Advanced Audio Devices, LLC v. HTC Corp., 139 S. Ct. 334 (2018) (denying Advanced Auto’s writ of 
certiorari). 
200. Christy, Inc., No. 18-657C, 2019 U.S. Claims LEXIS 29, at *1 (I expect Christy, Inc. will appeal this 
dismissal). 
201. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379. 
202. Complaint, supra note 196, at 1. 
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the damages are often “difficult and expensive” to determine through trial.204 The 
combination of these challenges in the form of a Takings Clause class action suit poses 
significantly different levels of challenge for courts to answer as a result of the Oil States
decision. 
The investment necessary to create a new technology and then obtain and defend a 
patent on that technology is wide ranging and difficult to accurately quantify. Justice 
Gorsuch in the opening lines of his dissent in Oil States attempts to summarize the 
significant investment demanded of patentees in their excursion to obtain a patent grant. 
First, there is “much hard work and no little investment” devoted to the creation of 
something the inventor believes to be “truly novel.”205 Justice Gorsuch’s non-specific 
statement demonstrates the difficulty of quantifying the amount invested in the creation of 
an invention. Some companies share research and development cost data, which reveals it 
“costs at least $4 billion, and it can be as much as $11 billion” for a pharmaceutical 
company to develop a new drug.206 Second, inventors must then “endure the further cost 
and effort of applying for a patent.”207 Justice Gorsuch estimates the cost to be $30,000 
and the process might take two years,208 which seems to be in line with other industry 
estimates, though the amount may vary.209
One component of this process, the fees imposed by the USPTO upon the 
prospective patentee, are well-defined in the USPTO’s Fee Schedule.210 These fees are 
considered an excise tax because they are “levied upon the acquisition and ownership of . 
. . a ‘particular kind’ of personal property” like those the government levies against 
community property, gifts, estate assets, etc.211 Thus, at least these taxes will be easy to 
evaluate as damages because they are guaranteed to be required of the patentee in the 
application and maintenance of his patent. 
Once a patent is issued, patentees must then defend their patents against challenges 
in post-grant proceedings such as the inter partes review process.212 These expenses may 
never be realized because a post-grant challenge may never materialize, but in the event 
that they do, the expenses could rise beyond $17,000,000.213 In contrast to this enormous 
                                                        
204. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 34 F.R.D. 15, 20 (S.D. Tex. 1963). 
205. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 206. Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES (Feb 10, 2012), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-
drugs/#7b2dbbbc4a94. 
207. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
208. Id.
209. See Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485/; John Powers, The 
Short and Long Answers on Patent Applications, BEST LAWYERS (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://www.bestlawyers.com/article/how-long-does-it-take-to-obtain-a-patent/2065.
 210. USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-
resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). 
211. Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 261). 
 212. Josh Malone, $17 Million: The Real and Staggering Cost to Patent in the US in the PTAB Age,
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expense and investment, some inventors choose to approach the process solo in an effort 
to save money.214 Consequently, the first bucket of the Christy, Inc. class action suit will 
be arduous for a court to quantify, except for the taxes in the form of application and 
maintenance fees. 
As to the second bucket, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to determine the 
amount of lost income as a result of being precluded from seeking licensing and royalty 
fees from infringers of a patent that effectively never existed in the first place. Patent 
damage trials remain “difficult and expensive,”215 but the court deciding the Christy, Inc. 
class action will be faced with determining the amount of money that a patent owner might
have been able to garner through prospective patent licensing.216
Both of these categories of damages under the Takings Clause will be difficult to 
determine, but each also introduce a whole host of other questions that must be answered. 
For example, if a patent is held to be unpatentable by the PTAB through inter partes 
review, it is as if the patent never issued in the first place.217 This would produce odd 
results as to both of the categories of damages in the class action suit’s Takings Clause 
challenge. As to the first bucket, assume a patentee has invested $100,000 in the patenting 
process prior to issuance; following the patent’s issuance, assume the inventor incurred 
expenses of $500,000 as a result of maintenance fees, efforts to license the technology, 
and defense of the patent against challengers. If a patent is found unpatentable ab initio, is 
the patentee entitled to $100,000 for the pre-issuance expenses incurred, $600,000 for all 
expenses incurred, or some number in between? If some number in between, then which 
expenses should be considered under the Takings Clause? Should the number comprise 
only those expenses paid to the USPTO and the expenses paid in defending the patent 
against challenges to patentability in front of the USPTO’s PTAB, or should it also include 
the expenses incurred by the patentee for seeking to license the patented technology in 
reliance on the USPTO’s grant of a valid patent in the first place?
Similar timing issues exist as to the second bucket. For example, assume that the 
patent issues and the patentee successfully obtains patent infringement damages in United 
States district court in the amount of $1,000,000. Assume further that ten years following 
the issuance of the patent, it is found to be unpatentable by the USPTO. In Apple, Inc. v. 
Samsung, the court held that because “the patent was void ab initio, . . . damages would 
also be precluded.”218 Does that holding apply only as to the litigants in a pre-existing 
suit? Does it apply only to litigants in other open or potential future cases involving the 
subject patent? Or does that holding apply to preclude all damages obtained subsequent to 
the issuance of the subject patent? If the latter version of the holding does not apply, the 
defendants in the pre-unpatentability decisions have effectively paid damages in a case 
                                                        
 214. My Patent Experience, FRUGALPATENTS, http://frugalpatents.com/?page_id=92 (last visited Jan. 18, 
2019). 
215. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 34 F.R.D. 15 (S.D. Tex. 1963). 
216. Wang Lab. v. Oki Elec. Indus. Co., 15 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172 (D. Mass. 1998). 
217. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168683 at *46 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013) 
(quoting Standard Havens Prods. v. Gencor Indus., 996 F.2d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
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that had no legal basis originally. If the latter version of the holding does apply, then it 
seems the $1,000,000 earned by the patentee must be returned to the defendants because 
there was no patent viable for the original suit and subsequent judgment to stand on. 
The cause of this confusion stems from the fact that the takings challenge in the 
Christy, Inc. class action suit attempts to treat the symptoms, not the source of the problem. 
It does however help to reveal the myriad issues that result from the Oil States ruling.219
Beyond the issues previously described, the other most significant issue includes the due 
process implication. 
B. A Constitutional Due Process Challenge May Be Viable but Might Also Result in the 
Elimination of the America Invents Act in Its Entirety 
The Supreme Court’s Oil States decision specifically invited another form of 
constitutional challenge—due process.220 Due process may indeed provide a viable 
challenge to the constitutionality of the inter partes review process under the Mathews v. 
Eldridge factors.221 However, this challenge carries along with it a risk of constitutionally 
nullifying the entirety of the America Invents Act because the Act does not include a 
severability clause.222 This line of attack may prove fruitful, but would risk throwing out 
the baby with the bathwater.
1. The Mathews v. Eldridge Factors Indicate the Inter Partes Review Process May 
Violate Procedural Due Process Protections 
Mathews v. Eldridge sets out a three-part balancing test for the determination of 
whether an administrative procedure provides constitutionally sufficient protection to a 
private interest.223 The factors include (1) the private interest affected by official action 
(2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the government’s 
interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedures would entail.224
As to the first Mathews factor, the private interest affected is a personal property 
right in the form of a patent grant. As discussed above, the United States Constitution 
provides that a patent is a right,225 various court decisions throughout United States history 
have held that a patent grant is a personal property right,226 furthermore, Congress codified 
                                                        
219. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). 
220. Id. at 1379; see James Carmichael & Brad Close, Despite Oil States, Inter Partes Review May Still Be 
Held Unconstitutional, IPWatchdog, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/25/despite-oil-states-inter-partes-
review-may-still-be-held-unconstitutional/id=96406/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). 
221. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 222. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1 (2011). 112 CONG. REC. 4,491 (2011) (severability clause offered, without 
objection, for inclusion within the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and subsequently removed without 
objection). 
223. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
224. Id. at 332. 
 225. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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the importance of the property rights afforded to the patent grant in the Patent Act of 
1952227 and affirmed those rights in the 2012 passage of the America Invents Act.228
As to the second Mathews factor, Congress in its creation of the America Invents 
Act attempted to safeguard against erroneous deprivation of the private interest at stake 
through their implementation of explicit estoppel rules,229 statute of limitations in which 
petitions for inter partes review may be made,230 and the right to appeal from a final 
written decision by the USPTO’s PTAB—an Article I administrative agency—to the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—an Article III appellate court.231 However, each of 
these safeguards fails to adequately protect the private interest at stake because their 
probable value is limited by the standard of proof applicable to the underlying proceeding.  
Congress commanded that an issued patent “shall be presumed valid,”232 and the 
United States Supreme Court held this statutory language requires a showing of invalidity 
of a patent by clear and convincing evidence.233 Thus, the proper standard of proof to be 
applied to the evaluation of an issued patent should be the clear and convincing standard. 
However, inter partes review only requires a showing of unpatentability according to a 
preponderance of the evidence standard.234 Thus, any estoppel provisions, statute of 
limitations, and right to appeal are hamstrung by the required application of this lower 
standard. 
Furthermore, the failure of these safeguards is intensified by the time bar loophole 
inherent in Congress’ design of the America Invents Act. As discussed above, this 
loophole presents defendants with the ability to challenge the granting of a patent in inter 
partes review proceedings up to twenty-seven years after the patent’s issuance.235 Thus, a 
defendant in an infringement lawsuit may challenge the patentability of a patent under a 
preponderance of the evidence standard even after the patent has expired. Even more, the 
Federal Circuit holds that “[it] lack[s] jurisdiction to review ‘the Board’s determination to 
initiate IPR proceedings based on its assessment of the time-bar of § 315(b), even if such 
assessment is reconsidered during the merits phase of proceedings and restated as part of 
the Board’s final written decision.’”236 Consequently, even if a defendant fails to file a 
petition within the time limit specified in § 315(b), the USPTO may nonetheless institute 
IPR without fear of review. This further exacerbates the failure of these safeguards by 
leaving the patent holder with limited recourse. If this is true, can a patent every truly vest 
as a personal property right in the inventor carrying with it the greater protections afforded 
to it by Congress and the United States Supreme Court in the form of adjudication in front 
of an Article III court, applying the clear and convincing standard, or trial by jury? 
                                                        
227. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 229. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2). 
 230. § 311(c). 
 231. §§ 141(a), 314(d), 315(b), 318, 319; Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1374–75 (2018) 
(holding that time-bar determination of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) is appealable despite 35 U.S.C. § 314(d)). 
 232. § 282(a). 
233. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011). 
 234. § 316(e). 
235. See supra notes 151–56 and accompanying text. 
 236.  Shaw Indus. Grp. v. Automated Creel Sys., 817 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016). But cf. Achates 
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This Mathews factor is severely deficient in its protections of the private interest at 
stake. Even if the procedural safeguards currently in place would normally safeguard the 
private interest at stake, the inferior burden of proof employed by these so-called 
safeguards certainly leads to an erroneous deprivation of the private interest at stake when 
compared with the standards decreed by Congress and enforced by the United States 
Supreme Court. Moreover, the time bar loophole exacerbates the harm done by allowing 
a challenger to take advantage of the lower burden of proof at virtually any time, in clear 
contravention of the nine-month statute of limitations, and without the benefit of review 
by an Article III court. 
The third factor, the government’s interest, seems to be of no consequence in this 
instance because there are additional or substitute procedures in place which would not 
require undue fiscal and administrative burdens. The government’s interest is in 
“securing” the “exclusive Rights” to patent holders and then protecting those rights in 
accordance with the Constitution, Congress’ legislative intent, the USPTO’s mission, and 
judicial precedent.237 As a result, the government already has procedures in place in the 
form of the United States District Court system which is capable of handling such disputes 
without undue fiscal and administrative burdens just as it has throughout its history. 
2. The America Invents Act May Be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny and Susceptible 
to Complete Nullification If Constitutional Challenges Are Effective 
If pursued, this constitutional due process challenge may result in a scenario in 
which the entire America Invents Act could be nullified. The United States Supreme Court 
previously explained that “[i]f a statute invades a ‘fundamental’ right . . . it is subject to 
strict scrutiny.”238 In a separate case, the Supreme Court held that “property is a natural, 
fundamental right.”239 Thus, the America Invents Acts may be subject to strict scrutiny if 
a constitutional due process challenge is brought under the Mathews v. Eldridge
framework. 
If a statute fails to include a severability clause, the Supreme Court may hold the 
entirety of the law unconstitutional even if only one part is unconstitutional.240 The 
Supreme Court has held that if Congress merely fails to include a severability clause, the 
Court will consider one to be implied.241 However, when Congress intentionally removes 
a particular provision prior to enactment, “it may be presumed that the limitation was not 
intended.”242 In the Congressional Record leading up to the passage of the America 
Invents Act, Congress did not merely make an oversight by forgetting to include a 
severability clause. Instead, a severability clause was offered without objection and 
                                                        
237. See supra Part II.A and notes 38–43 and accompanying text; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; About Us,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/about-us (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). 
238. Mass. Bd. of Ret.v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976). 
239. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 510 (2005). 
240. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312 (1936) (holding in the absence of a severability clause, “the 
presumption is that the legislature intends an act to be effective as an entirety”). 
241. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 488 (1995). 
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subsequently removed without objection.243 Therefore, the America Invents Act may be 
susceptible to complete nullification if a constitutional challenge as to one part of it is 
effective. 
C. The Director’s Rulemaking Authority Provides a Limited Avenue to Address the Issue 
The USPTO is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act because it is an 
administrative agency within the executive branch of government.244 The Administrative 
Procedure Act affords administrative agencies the ability to propose and prescribe rules.245
Congress imbued the Director of the USPTO with the authority to “prescrib[e] regulations 
under this section,” taking into account the “integrity of the patent system,” and “the 
efficient administration of the Office.”246
However, the USPTO Director’s hands are tied. When “Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue,” and its “intent . . . is clear, that is the end of the 
matter.”247 Congress has spoken directly about the precise issues of: (1) the time bar 
loophole,248 and (2) the lower burden of proof.249 Thus, the court and the agency “must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”250 While the Director of 
the USPTO may be able to address other issues that lead to uncertainty in the patent 
system, on this issue he is powerless. 
V. CONCLUSION
Congress’ 2012 change to the patent system doomed patent litigation to produce 
absurd results that ensure patent rights are never truly vested in the owner. The only 
guarantees afforded to the owner of a patent include the payment of excise taxes in the 
form of application and maintenance fees, and that his patent property rights will be 
stripped from him in front of an administrative agency, applying a low burden of proof, 
without the right to a trial by jury. As identified by this Comment, a loophole exists in the 
statutory design of the America Invents Act. This loophole allows defendants in patent 
infringement suits to avoid Article III courts and the protections afforded to patents by the 
higher burden of proof. Instead, defendants may choose to file a petition with an 
administrative agency, availing themselves of a much more lax burden of proof, at any 
time during a patent’s life and beyond. In effect, this loop hole forces the Article III 
judiciary to bow to the power of an Article I administrative agency. 
I propose that Congress eliminate the time bar loophole found in 35 U.S.C. § 
315(b).251 This narrowly tailored solution would harmonize the holding in Oil States—
that inter partes review and thus, the lower burden of proof utilized in those proceedings 
                                                        
 243. 112 CONG. REC. 4, 491 (2011). 
 244. 5 U.S.C. § 551. 
245. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(B). 
 246. § 316(b). 
247. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 248. § 315(b). 
 249. § 316(e). 
250. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
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is constitutional252—with the currently conflicting provisions of the America Invents Act 
which mandate issued patents be presumed valid.253 Additionally, this solution will 
mitigate one source of potential constitutional challenge to the America Invents Act as 
invited by the Supreme Court’s decision in Oil States.254 Finally, this solution increases 
the reliability of the United States’ patent system by providing patent owners and the 
public with a clearer guarantee of their constitutionally protected rights. 
- Jason Wietholter*†
                                                        
252. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018). 
 253. § 282(a). 
254. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379. 
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† Following the editing of this note, but prior to its publication, the United States Supreme Court decided Thryv, 
Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 2406 (Apr. 20, 2020). The Court held 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) 
prevents Article III review of the USPTO's decision to institute inter partes review, even when the petitioner 
exceeds the one-year statute of limitations found in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). This holding further exacerbates the 
impacts of the time bar loophole by denying patent owners recourse even when a fundamental, procedural legal 
protection is violated. 
